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INTRODUCTION
With a view to the rapid transition of financial markets and
institutions and the emergence of new risks, it is necessary to
improve financial regulations continuously on an
international level. As far as banking regulations are
concerned, the international capital standards published by
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision are set as
benchmarks and currently provide a basis for several EU
directives as well. The purpose of the Basel capital standards
is to set forth regulatory principles at the international level,
with the aim of creating a level playing field, enhancing the
stability of banks and protecting the interests of customers.
The new Basel rules adopted in 2004 (Basel II) fundamentally
rearrange the principles and practical application of bank
regulations, and are expected to have a significant impact on
the banks’ behaviour, and thereby on the real economy.
According to plans, the new Basel rules will be implemented
in more than 100 countries and made part of their national
laws, which also means that their impact will be felt in many
countries in the near future. The transposition of EU
directives which are based on Basel II into Hungarian law
took place in the summer of 2007.
2
Nowadays, the key element of bank regulations lies in the
definition of capital requirements consistent with the risks
assumed, as capital is the primary source to absorb losses, and
thereby to protect depositors and other clients. To this end,
it is of particular importance to have risks assessed accurately,
and to define the capital requirement to cover potential
losses. However, one major characteristic of risks is that they
are not constant over time: when economic cycles are on the
rise, expectations become more optimistic while the income
of economic agents is also on the upswing, thereby improving
their credit repayment capability, the value of collaterals is
increasing and the number of bankruptcies is declining. In
these cases, the level of measured risks is decreasing, and
hence, the capital requirements prescribed for banks under
the new Basel rules are also more lenient.
However, risks tend to build up during times characterised by
strong economic activity, and they materialise in banks’
books as losses in times of economic depression. What this
means is that if a bank fails to build up its reserves in ‘good
times’, it may become capital-constrained at times when the
economy turns sour and when losses begin to accumulate; in
other words, it will not be able to comply with the statutory
provisions relating to capital requirements. One possible
reaction banks might take to the above-specified phenomena
is to cut back on lending operations and refuse loans to
customers whom they deem risky in order to reduce the
capital requirement. However, this could lead to the deprival
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One of the main functions of the central bank is to strengthen the stability of the financial system, an important aspect of which
is to take an active part in the legislation process to improve the regulatory environment and to assess the potential impacts of
new regulatory measures. In the summer of 2007 substantial changes took place in the governance of financial institutions with
the introduction of regulations based on the new Basel capital standards (Basel II). The objective of this study is to investigate
the likely consequences of such new bank regulations and their potential impact on financial stability. To this end, the study
analyses the foreseeable developments in the cyclicality of capital requirements of banks based on the corporate credit portfolio
of internationally active large banks, and points out that bank regulations are not always capable of fulfilling their intended
function of enhancing financial stability in times of economic distress. Notably, the prospective increase in the cyclicality of
capital requirements could well lead to a deepening of economic problems and to instability in the banking system, if the
banking system appears undercapitalised relative to the risks assumed. All of this highlights the need for the development of a
forward-looking risk assessment system and a supportive regulatory regime providing proper incentives.
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1This analysis is based on Zsámboki, Balázs (2007): Basel II and financial stability. An investigation of sensitivity and cyclicality of capital requirements based on QIS 5,
published under MNB Occasional Papers.
2The transposition of Directive 2006/48/EC adopted on the basis of Basel II into Hungarian law was implemented by Act LI of 2007 on the Amendment of Act CXII of
1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises and Other Regulations Concerning Specialised Credit Institutions, and by Government Decree 196/2007 (VII. 30.)
on Credit Risk Management and Capital Requirement for Credit Risk.of resources from economic agents who needed them the
most. Typically, small and medium-sized companies are
considered as such, as their access to alternative financial
resources, apart from banks, is limited.
The correlation between lending cycles and economic cycles,
i.e. procyclical banking behaviour is clearly apparent in most
countries, however, the role of capital regulations for banks
is not yet clear in this process. The objective of this study is
to analyse the ties between real economic cycles and the
cyclicality of capital requirements for banks, and thereby to
provide a better understanding of the foreseeable
consequences of the new bank regulations and their potential
impact on financial stability. In this analysis, it is important to
point out that the fluctuation in capital requirements fails to
convey a complete picture on the impact of changes in risk
factors that may occur over time, as banks are required to
cover their losses not only with capital, but also by making
provisions or value adjustments (hereinafter referred to
collectively as ‘provisions’). While capital covers unexpected
losses, provisions are set aside to cover expected losses.
3 It is
important to point out that banks are required to cover any
shortage of provisions with capital, consequently, in this
analysis we will address both capital and provisioning
requirements in terms of their movements over time.
This article is intended to point out that, even though the
ultimate goal of these regulations is to support banks’
prudent operation, and through it to promote economic
growth, these rules relating to individual institutions possibly
fail to fulfil their role in supporting economic development
and stability in times of economic distress. If the banking
system on aggregate is undercapitalised relative to the risk
assumed, the rules themselves could contribute to pushing
the economy toward a deepening crisis, and therefore to
destabilising the banking system.
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF BASEL II
The original regulatory framework adopted in Basel in 1988
(Basel I) contained uniform rules for all corporate exposures
in terms of risks. Irrespective of differences in default and
recovery rates, a risk weight of 100% was assigned to all
corporate exposures, and a capital requirement of 8% of the
amount of such risk-weighted exposure was defined.
4 One of
the major innovations of the new Basel capital standards
(Basel II) is that risk weighting and the calculation of capital
requirements have become more sensitive to changes in risks,
with respect to the relative riskiness of exposures and the
changes in riskiness of a specific exposure over time. The
previous regime is replaced by a revised standardised method
and by two internal rating based (IRB) methods, for banks to
choose the most suitable one for their needs, consistent with
the risk management practices they employ. Of the two IRB
approaches, the more advanced one allows banks to
determine – subject to supervisory recognition – the risk
weight for each exposure using their own estimates of risk
parameters, and consequently their capital requirements.
These risk parameters include the probability of default (PD),
loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD) and
maturity (M) estimated for each exposure.
Banks use a variety of statistical methods and internal risk
models to estimate the aforementioned parameters, which
then have to be substituted into the risk weight functions
prescribed by the regulators to arrive at the capital
requirement for the exposures in question. In this context, it
is important to point out that while the risk weight functions
define a cross-sectional relation, meaning that they measure
the relative riskiness of various exposures, these very same
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3 Expected losses are generally incurred in connection with the banks' usual business activities, and may be estimated with statistical methods. Banks usually recover
their expected losses through pricing of loans. On the other hand, unexpected losses are treated as being generated by extraordinary events (e.g. external economic
shocks), which have to be covered by capital.
4 Risk weights are designed to express the degree of riskiness of bank loans and other exposures in relative terms. Different weight risks are assigned to different
exposures. In the Basel I regulatory framework the risk weight assigned to exposures to the central government and the central bank is 0%, to exposures to banks it
is 20%, to exposures covered with mortgage it is 50%, and finally to other corporate and household exposures it is 100%. Banks are required to sum up their exposures
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Note: In the above illustration for corporate and other retail loans an LGD
of 45% and for mortgage loans an LGD of 20% is assumed, based on the
average LGD data of QIS 5. Using higher LGDs would increase the
steepness of the functions, while lower values would flatten out the
functions. As regards corporate SME loans, where the regulations prescribe
different risk weights according to the size of the firm, annual revenues of
EUR 25 million are assumed for SMEs.functions are to be applied to determine the capital
requirement in connection with changes in riskiness of a
specific exposure over time. Notably as time goes by,
parameter estimations tend to change accordingly, just as the
regulatory capital requirement for the individual exposures.
The risk weights of different portfolio components are
illustrated in Chart 1 as a function of PD. The chart clearly
indicates that the risk weight of corporate exposures could be
much lower or higher than the 100% specified uniformly
under Basel I, depending on the probability of default.
The probable effects of the new Basel rules are addressed in
several impact studies, the most comprehensive of which is
the so-called Fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 5)
conducted during the second half of 2005 by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, with the findings
published in 2006.
5 The impact study indicates the prospects
concerning capital requirements for specific portfolios in a
given time, but fails to offer any information relating to the
dynamics of capital requirements. Consequently, the findings
of the study largely depend on the macroeconomic and
financial market conditions prevailing at the particular time,
which was decidedly favourable during the period under
review. From the perspective of financial stability, however,
it is important to investigate how booms and depressions in
the economy influence developments in the capital
requirements of banks over time.
The only database that is available to the general public, and
that would be required for the purposes of the analysis, is
concerned with corporate exposures. This study relies on the
database of Moody’s, a credit rating agency, including data
from the period between 1983 and 2006 to model changes in
the capital requirements for corporate credit portfolios in the
various phases of economic cycles. This database contains
information on corporate exposures covering approximately
5,000 companies worldwide. The 1983-2006 period covered
by the analysis contains two recession periods (1990-91 and
2001-2002). The database offers information on the default
rates within the various categories, the spread of such
defaults and the minimum and maximum rates during the
period under review.
6 In the analysis numerous assumptions
are made, which have to be taken into consideration for the
evaluation of the results as well.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
For the analysis of the impacts of the new Basel capital
regulations, first we have to create a model bank, whose
corporate portfolio reflects the composition of the portfolios
of major international banks. On the one hand, this is
necessary because Basel II is also calibrated upon these types
of institutions, and on the other hand because the rated
companies in Moody’s database are typically clients of large
banks. As for portfolio composition, we relied on the findings
of QIS 5. Then, based on this portfolio, the effects of changes
in risk parameters are investigated, calculating the
developments of expected and unexpected losses over time as
well as the impacts of changes in quality composition of the
portfolio.
7
Estimation of probability of default (PD)
QIS 5 lists the various exposures under three categories with
different PD bands. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer
to these categories as good, average and poor portfolios.
From the perspective of this study, it is imperative to
determine the average PD for these categories, and
consequently to review developments in these average PDs
over time. To this end, the following assumptions were
employed:
1. For good and average categories, we consider the middle of
the PD bands as defined in QIS 5 as the average PD.
Therefore, in the ‘good’ category the PD is the middle of the
0-0.2% band, that is 0.1%, while in the ‘average’ category it
is the middle of the 0.2-0.8% band, that is 0.5%.
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5The impact study covers approximately 400 banks from around the globe. For more details, see BCBS (2006).
6 For a detailed description of the database, see Hamilton et al. (2007).
7 In this paper only the effects of changing PD and LGD are analysed, while both EAD and M are assumed to be constant.
Good Average Poor
PD band <0.2% 0.2–0.8% 0.8–99.99%
Share of corporate exposures 38.5 31.8 27.8
Table 1
Percentages of corporate exposures of large international banks according to PD bands in accordance 
with QIS 5 (%)
Source: BCBS (2006).2.  In the ‘poor’ category, that covers the 0.8-99.99% PD
band, the middle of the band would be unrealistic for any
estimation of the average PD. Therefore, in this category
we will make calculations with two alternative
assumptions, namely 3% and 7% PDs. These PDs are close
to the average default rate of exposures classified as
speculative by the credit rating agencies, therefore, they
can be interpreted empirically as well.
Naturally, breaking up the portfolio into three categories
makes the analysis considerably simpler, as the new Basel
rules require banks to set up at least 7 categories. This type
of breakdown, however, is not possible with the publicly
available databases, but the impact mechanisms of Basel II
under such simplified conditions is still more understandable
than if we were to use only one average corporate PD
estimate.
In the next step, we examine which category a portfolio with
a presumed 0.1%, 0.5%, or 3% and 7% average PD can be
mapped with Moody’s database. This analysis makes a critical
assumption, namely that a bank portfolio with a specific
average PD behaves during an economic cycle the same way
as a portfolio with similar average PD according to the
Moody’s database. However, it is important to emphasise
that the new Basel rules require banks to make their own PD
estimates under the internal rating categories based on the
long-term average default rate observed in the given
category. Therefore, in this analysis we assumed that our
model bank uses the five-year average default rate to estimate
the PDs for the exposures listed under the category in
question (in other words, the PD estimated for 1987 is the
same as the average default rate of the previous five-year
period). This assumption smoothes out short-term
fluctuations of PDs, and as such it can be viewed as a step
toward a through-the-cycle rating method.
Estimation of loss given default (LGD)
In connection with LGDs, initially a fixed 45% is assumed,
then we will make calculations for LGDs as a function of
PDs. There are several studies to prove that there is positive
correlation between PDs and LGDs, which naturally has an
impact on the capital requirements of banks as well, meaning
that this relation has to be taken into consideration for these
calculations.
8 Therefore, as an alternative scenario a simple
relation between PDs and LGDs is assumed, which is still
consistent with the results of empirical studies. In our
analysis, in the environment of long-term average PDs the
LGD is assumed to be 45%, however, the more significant
fluctuations seen in the PDs are assumed to have an impact
on the LGDs as well. The assumed relationship between PDs
and LGDs is shown in the table below.
Accordingly, if the 5-year average PD is at least 25% greater
(smaller) than the long-term 24-year average from between
1983 and 2006, according to our estimate the LGD changes
from 45% to 50% (or 40%). If the 5-year average PD is at
least 50% greater than the long-term average, we will apply
an LGD value of 55%, or 35% if it remains that much
behind.
Naturally, these assumptions are arbitrary, merely attempting
to provide a more accurate understanding of the impact
mechanisms and systemic consequences of Basel II. All of the
banks using the more advanced IRB approaches will have
their own estimates of PDs and LGDs, and the correlations
calculated on their own portfolios could even be different,
however, they are unlikely to deviate substantially on average
from the assumptions made in this study, in line with those
commonly supported by academic literature.
CYCLICALITY OF UNEXPECTED LOSSES
(CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS)
The Moody’s database is an adequate tool to define average
default rates for each rating categories and to monitor
changes in the default rates within the various categories
during the economic cycles. According to the database, the
average long-term PD of the Baa2 rating category is 0.107%,
that is practically the same as the 0.1% average PD assigned
to the portfolio of our model bank with a ‘good’ rating,
therefore, in our analysis we presume that this portfolio will
behave during the cycle as the portfolio rated Baa2 by
Moody’s. Similarly, the average long-term PD for Moody’s
Ba1 rating category is 0.636%, that corresponds with the
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PD5 < PD24 ⋅ ⋅ 0,5 PD24 ⋅ ⋅ 0,5 ≤ ≤ PD5 PD24  ⋅ ⋅ 0,75 ≤ ≤ PD5 PD24 ⋅ ⋅ 1,25 < PD5 PD24 ⋅ ⋅ 1,5 < PD5
< PD24 ⋅ ⋅ 0,75 ≤ ≤ PD24 ⋅ ⋅ 1,25 ≤ ≤ PD24 ⋅ ⋅ 1,5
LGD 35% 40% 45% 50% 55%
Table 2
Assumptions relating to LGDs
Note: ‘PD5’ means the 5-year average PD, while ‘PD24’ means the long-term (24-year) average PD.
8 For more details concerning the findings of the studies and a list of references, see Zsámboki (2007).0.5% PD assigned to the portfolio of our model bank with
‘average’ rating. As for the portfolios rated ‘poor’ we apply
two alternative assumptions: one is to make calculations for
the B1 rating category, whose average PD is 3.132%, and for
the B2 rating category with an average PD of 7.004%. The
share of each rating category within the entire corporate
portfolio is determined in accordance with QIS 5.
Chart 2 contains a summation of our calculations and shows
the supposed trends in the capital requirements of banks
covering expected losses during the period under review, if
we were to calculate them according to the Basel II rules, and
if we were to apply the positive correlation between PDs and
LGDs. Apparently, there is considerable fluctuation in
corporate capital requirements in spite of applying a 5-year
average PD, that has a smoothing effect on the cycles in
question. Moreover, relative to the fixed 45% LGD
hypothesis, variations in LGD, depending on the PDs, have
an additional cycle-strengthening impact on capital
requirements. The chart below indicates the supposed course
of capital requirements under B1 and B2 ratings for the
‘poor’ category.
The results indicate that capital requirements remain, on the
average, below the 8% prescribed in Basel I, and that they
could be somewhat higher in times of recession, or drop to
close to half in times of economic boom. It is also apparent
that our alternative assumptions on the portfolios with ‘poor’
rating have only moderate effect on the level of capital
requirements, and they do not influence the shape of the
curve materially. Consequently, if we were to apply the
changes in the average PDs, and the positive correlation
between PDs and LGDs, capital requirements may vary
considerably, even assuming a constant portfolio
composition.
CYCLICALITY OF EXPECTED LOSSES
Leaving our PD and LGD assumptions unchanged, Moody’s
database can be used for the estimation of expected losses as
well. Chart 3 demonstrates changes in expected losses during
the period under review. Contrary to the results contained in
the previous chapter, our alternative assumptions on the
portfolios with ‘poor’ rating have a substantial impact on the
size of expected losses; the difference between the need for
making provisions could be twofold. Furthermore, it is also
apparent that the amount of expected losses was significantly
higher during the early 1990s, when the deterioration in
portfolio quality mostly affected the portfolios with ‘poor’
rating, while deterioration in portfolio quality during the
early part of 2000 surfaced in the ‘average’ and ‘good’
categories, which did not have a major impact on expected
losses, but did have a considerable impact on capital
requirements, as risk weight functions are more sensitive to
any decline in the quality of exposures with higher ratings.
The combined effect of expected and unexpected losses, i.e.
provisioning and capital requirements is demonstrated
through a simple example. If our model bank has a corporate
exposure of EUR 100 million in 1998, which is considered as
a year with a low default ratio, and the composition of
portfolio in terms of rating and the correlation between risk
parameters is consistent with our previous assumptions, our
bank should have to set aside EUR 212,000 in provisions for
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(B2, variable LGD)expected losses if the portfolio was rated B1, with EUR 3
million in capital requirements according to Basel II. Under
the same conditions, in 2002, which was considered a
recession year, the requirement for provisioning would have
been EUR 541,000, with EUR 7.5 million in capital
requirements. What all this indicates is that significant
changes are expected to take place over a span of a few years
in terms of capital requirements and provisioning, even if the
portfolio composition remained unchanged.
IMPACT OF CHANGES IN PORTFOLIO
COMPOSITION ON CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
Up to this point, we have applied the same portfolio
composition throughout the analysis. However, in times of
recession ratings tend to drop, while they are more likely to
improve when the economy is booming. This process is seen
in the transition matrices calculated on the basis of Moody’s
database. Changes in the portfolio composition can be
estimated based on these transition matrices. Although credit
rating agencies prefer to classify their clients in a manner that
bridges several economic cycles, it is apparent that changes in
their rating tend to follow changes in the economy, i.e. they
are procyclical. For the purposes of analysis a year of
recession (2002) and a year when the economy was growing
(2004) was selected to demonstrate the effects of migration
in ratings. The original portfolio composition, calculated on
the basis of QIS 5, and hypothetical changes in portfolio
composition estimated based in the transition matrixes are
shown in Table 3.
Relying on this new portfolio composition we can estimate
changes in the capital requirements during the two years
under review. The results of these calculations are shown in
Chart 4.
Although, according to our calculations, the effects of
migration in ratings is not overly significant as regards
changes in capital requirements, monitoring these
developments might prove important for some
undercapitalised banks, as any unfavourable changes in
portfolio composition increases their capital requirements,
and consequently, it will take less time to deplete their capital
reserve, which in turn will force them to face the imposition
of regulatory minimum requirements.
CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of Moody’s corporate database we examined the
hypothetical changes in the capital requirements of banks for
the 1987-2006 period, with regard to movements of risk
parameters (PD and LGD) within an economic cycle, under
varying assumptions as to their correlation. According to our
findings, the regulatory minimum requirements calculated by
the advanced Basel II method could range within a broad
spectrum during the cycle, and it could double within a few
years, or may be cut in half, even if we use for the estimation
of PDs a 5-year average. Furthermore, we wish to point out
that the correlation between risk parameters has the potential
to significantly enhance fluctuation in capital requirements.
Consequently, it is of particular importance for banks to
build up capital reserves above the regulatory minimum
requirements when the economy is booming, in order to
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Quality band Share (QIS 5) Estimated share (2002) Estimated share (2004)
Good 38.5 34 43
Average 31.8 31 30
Poor 27.8 33 25
Defaulted 1.9 2 2
SUM 100 100 100
Table 3
Estimated effects of migration in ratings on portfolio composition
Chart 4
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Decrease in capital
requirement
from 2003 to 2004cover any future losses and any increase in capital
requirements.
Another important issue, naturally, is how binding regulatory
capital requirements are on banks, and how much institutions
tend to rely on their own internal capital calculation models in
the process of making business decisions (such as pricing,
lending intensity, etc.). These models are typically set to
estimate PDs for shorter periods, and they do not attempt to
classify their clients in a manner that bridges economic cycles,
hence movements in their internal capital requirement could be
greater. Consequently, even if regulatory capital requirements
are not effectively restrictive upon banks, changes in risk
parameters in terms of time could still have an impact on their
actions. Keeping a close eye on these factors should be essential
for the authorities responsible for promoting financial stability,
just as provisioning procedures. In the absence of proper
provisioning practices the indicators on capital adequacy cannot
be considered reliable, as in this case capital would serve to
cover expected losses to some extent as well.
Both insufficient provisions and undercapitalisation could
have an impact on the actions of banks and, under
unfavourable economic circumstances, some banks in tight
capital positions might be forced to cut back their lending
activities. The ensuing short supply of loans then may result
in further decline in economic growth, which in turn may
enhance fluctuations in the real economy, and could
compromise the stability of the financial system on the
whole, particularly in times of recession. Through the pricing
of bank funds, the market’s disciplinary power may play an
important role in forcing banks to take a more cautious
approach and to follow prudent behaviour even in the case of
appropriate capitalisation in times of economic boom. Under
Pillar 2 of Basel II, i.e. the supervisory review procedure,
supervisory authorities also have a responsibility of paying
proper attention to the adequate capitalisation of banks, in
response to the expected growth in fluctuations in capital
requirements.
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